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Abstract 
 
Previous empirical researches on Japanese subsidiaries have found that wholly-owned 
subsidiary (WOS) outperform joint venture (JV). However, these studies considered entry mode 
selection using a conventional ownership classification of JV, and limited their samples to 
developed countries and Asian developing countries. This paper examines entry mode based on 
non-conventional forms of JV, and the impact of ownership and internalization advantages on 
Japanese subsidiaries’ performance in Brazil. The findings suggest that Japanese-Japanese JV 
with a partner that has previous experience accumulated in the local market performed better 
than WOS and Traditional IJV. In addition, ownership and internalization advantages of 
multinational enterprises have mixed impact on subsidiaries performance. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Entry mode, FDI in Brazil, Japanese FDI, Japanese-Japanese JV, subsidiaries 
performance. 
 
 
Forthcoming 
Japan and the World Economy 
Department of Social Systems and Management, University of Tsukuba 
Discussion Paper Series No. 1120 
 - 3 -
1. Introduction 
Studies of entry mode selection by multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the subsidiary 
performance have attracted considerable attention (Li and Guisinger, 1991; Woodcock, Beamish 
and Makino, 1994; Nitsch, Beamish and Makino, 1996). Several empirical investigations have shown 
that entry mode choice has critical implications for the foreign investment’s performance. Previous 
studies analyzing Japanese overseas subsidiaries found evidence of performance difference 
between ownership-based entry mode, and showed that performance of wholly-owned subsidiary 
(WOS) tend to be better than joint venture (JV) (Woodcock et al., 1994; Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 
2000).   
Nevertheless, these studies have not taken into account the existence of other types of JVs, 
particularly Japanese subsidiaries. They have focused on two parent JVs formed between one 
foreign and one local firm, and have defined the JV by the percentage held by the foreign parent 
firm. Japanese firms have the characteristics of establishing JV with multiple and home-country 
partners (Makino and Beamish, 1998). Studies that examined this particularity of JV ownership on 
Japanese subsidiaries performance are quite limited (Makino and Beamish, 1998, Hanvanich, Miller, 
Richards and Cavusgil, 2003), but the investigation was restricted to the JV and there was no 
comparison between other entry modes.  
Furthermore, previous researches are limited to the samples of developed countries, such as 
the United States (Woodcock et al., 1994; Vega-Céspedes and Hoshino, 2001), and Europe (Nitsch 
et al., 1996); and some Asian developing countries (Makino and Delios, 1996; Makino and Beamish, 
1998), including a specific country such as Thailand (Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 2000). An 
exception (referring to a group of countries) is Latin America (Neupert and Montoya, 2000;Vega-
Céspedes and Hoshino, 2001) and Central and Eastern Europe (Beamish and Delios, 2001).  
Therefore, no research has attempted to examine the impact of entry mode, considering the 
new classification of JV on Japanese investments, on subsidiaries performance in Brazil. This 
country provides a good ground for an empirical test. First, Brazil is the fifth largest country in the 
world and the largest in the Southern Hemisphere. Second, it is the tenth largest economy and the 
sixth largest population in the world, about 170 million people in 2001. Comparing Brazil to other 
emerging markets worldwide, the economy is double the size of Russia’s and larger than India’s 
(IMF, 2001). Third, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows into Brazil tripled between 1996-98 to 
31 billion U.S. dollars. Brazil was the second in the ranking of FDI inflows in developing countries 
between 1997-99, and was the fifth most attractive recipient of FDI in the world between 1997-98 
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(JETRO, 2001). Based on a FDI Confidence Index (A.T. Kearney, 2002), Brazil in 1998 was the 
second, between 1999-2000 was the fourth, and in 2001 was the third world's most attractive 
destination of FDI. Fourth, for over a century, Japan and Brazil have been traditional partners 
collaborating in a wide variety of activities. According to Toyo Keizai Databank 2001, Brazil 
represents 63% of the total number of Japanese subsidiaries established in South America, and 
33% in Latin America. In the past, Brazil was the second most important host country of Japanese 
FDI after the U.S. (Beamish, Delios and Lecraw, 1997). Finally, Brazil has some characteristics that 
clearly differentiate her trend of productive internationalization from those observed in Asian 
countries of which the MNEs are more export oriented, while in Brazil the domestic market is the 
target. In some Asian countries, such as China and India, the host country government restricts the 
level of foreign ownership in local firms. These countries have pressured MNEs to develop JV with 
local firms rather than to set up WOS as a means for local companies to acquire technology (Anand 
and Delios, 1996). This kind of barriers and pressures to MNEs does not exist in Brazil. Therefore, 
Brazil provides not only an opportunity to test the impact of entry mode on performance of 
Japanese subsidiaries, but also makes such a test necessary. 
The present paper proposes that when using a new classification of JV, the JV formed between 
home-country based partners will achieve better performance than WOS and Traditional IJV. In 
addition to entry mode selection, some industry and firm-specific advantages have impact on 
Japanese subsidiary performance. No research has attempted to test these advantages in Brazil. 
Hence, this paper is the first empirical study that examines the impact of ownership, internalization 
advantages, and entry mode, based on a non-conventional ownership form of JV, on Japanese 
subsidiaries’ performance in Brazil.  
In the following sections, the study will discuss the theoretical background, the hypotheses 
concerning entry mode selection and the impact of ownership and internalization advantages on 
subsidiaries performance, the empirical design and methodology, the empirical analysis and the 
discussion of the results of four statistical tests and ordered logistic regression, and finally the 
conclusions and limitations of this study. 
 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Entry mode selection is one of the most important decisions faced by MNEs that are expanding 
in nations outside their home locations, whereby WOS and JV entail direct investment in business 
sites in the target country. WOS are subsidiaries in another nation in which the parent company 
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has full ownership and sole responsibility for the management of the operation.  JV on the other 
hand, involves a local and a foreign partner that share the ownership, management, risks, and 
rewards of the newly formed entity, and the international business literature has been defined as a 
JV by the percentage of equity held by the foreign parent: majority-owned (greater than 50% 
equity); co-owned (equal to 50% equity); and minority-owned (less than 50% equity). This 
conventional measurement assumes that the relative size of equity ownership represents the 
degree of control by the parent in the JV. On the other hand, there are other types of JVs, in a 
special case of Japanese subsidiaries. Makino and Beamish (1998) provide evidence that non-
conventional forms of JV are frequently occurring, which means that ownership structure does not 
imply that all JVs involve a local partner. They introduced a new classification, such as JV formed 
by multiple, with non-local, and by affiliated firms1. Previous studies on Japanese subsidiaries 
performance, which compare WOS and JV entry modes, did not take into account this particular 
characteristic. Therefore, using the 95% as cut-off point to differentiate between JV and WOS 
(Stopford and Wells, 1972; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991; 
Makino and Delios, 1996), and applying the concept of non-conventional ownership structure of JV 
(Makino and Beamish, 1998), this study considers entry mode choice based on this classification2: 
 
• Wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) - one Japanese parent firm holds at least 95% of the subsidiary 
equity; 
• Traditional International Joint Venture (IJV) – formed between Japanese partner(s) and local 
partner(s). One Japanese parent firm holds at least 10%3 and no more than 95% of the subsidiary 
equity; 
• Japanese-Japanese JV  - formed between Japanese partners. One Japanese partner holds at least 
10% and no more than 95% of the subsidiary equity; 
 
Entering a foreign country through a Traditional IJV can be an effective strategy and 
opportunity for gaining local partner’s knowledge about the local institutional framework, local 
consumer tastes, business practices, and avoid costly mistakes in the new environmental (Chen and 
                                                 
1  Makino and Beamish classified JV into four ownership structures: Intrafirm JV (JV formed between affiliated home-country 
based firms); Cross-national Domestic JV (JV formed between unaffiliated home-country based firms); Traditional IJV (JV 
formed between home-country based and host-country based firms); and Trinational IJV (JV formed between home-
country and third-country based firms). 
2  There is no Trinational IJV in the sample used in this study.  
3  According to Toyo Keizai Databank 2001 used in this study. 
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Hu, 2002). Moreover, it allows sharing the risks and the resource requirements of foreign entry 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Resources in this context could be either tangible resources (i.e. 
plant and capital) or intangible resources (i.e. market or operational know-how) (Woodcock et al., 
1994). However, Traditional IJV also entails unique risks, which is a potential problem of 
cooperating with a partner from a different national culture4. It means that a high level of national 
cultural distance exists between partners (Makino and Beamish, 1998). Cultural distance is the 
difference in the values and beliefs shared between investing country and host country. Large 
cultural distances lead to high transaction costs for multinationals investing overseas (Chen and Hu, 
2002) and may limit the effectiveness of behavioral-based control mechanisms that rely upon trust, 
value congruence and respect (Woodcock et al., 1994). In addition, JV formed by partners from 
different countries will also often have different mother tongues, and this can be expected to cause 
greater communication problems (Hennart and Zeng, 2002). Cultural differences may create 
ambiguities and mistrust in the relationship, which may lead to cross-cultural conflicts between 
parents of different nationalities, and even dissolution of the venture (Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 
1996; Hennart and Zeng, 2002). 
Japanese-Japanese JV involves firms from the same country, consequently they are more likely 
to have or have had dealings with one another, and hence, are less likely to misunderstand each 
other (Hennart and Zeng, 2002). According to Makino and Beamish (1998) the cultural distance 
level among home-country based firms is lower than the Traditional IJV, and they suggest that JV 
between partners with similar national cultures should experience higher survival rates and 
performance levels than JV between partners with dissimilar cultures. Therefore, partner cultural 
difference can affect foreign firm’s performance in the host country (Parkhe, 1991), increase the 
likelihood of conflict between them (Hennart and Zeng, 2002), and can even cause the parent firms 
to terminate the JV (Barkema et al., 1996), thus:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The Japanese-Japanese JV entry mode will achieve, on average, higher performance than 
Traditional IJV entry mode. 
 
WOS offer firms the highest levels of control, since there is no problem of having to integrate 
different cultures, divergent strategic viewpoints, and separate policies (Nitsch et al., 1996). 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
4  According to Hofstede (1997) the following dimensions of cultural scales (Brazil, Japan): power distance (69, 54), 
individualism (38, 46), uncertainty avoidance (76, 92), masculinity (49, 95), and long-term orientation (65, 80).  
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However, it requires the highest resource commitments, it is a high investment risk, and the firm 
has the disadvantage of being ‘foreign’ in the local environment. This disadvantage stems from a 
lack of local knowledge which comprises information and know-how about the local economy, 
politics, culture and business customs of a region; information on local demands and tastes; as well 
as information on how to access the local labor force, distribution channels, infrastructure, raw 
materials and other factors required for the conduct of business in the host country (Makino and 
Delios, 1996).  
In addition to the similarity of culture and language, the partners of Japanese-Japanese JV 
have the benefit to share the risk and the resource requirements to establish a new venture. 
Furthermore, most of the Japanese-Japanese JVs in Brazil are formed between home-country 
partners that have previous experience in the local market 5 . The accumulation of operational 
experience in a host country, considered to be the means of knowledge acquisition of the local 
economy, politics and culture, has been postulated to free the firm from the need for a local 
partner (Makino and Delios, 1996). This characteristic has the advantage to gain local knowledge 
through a Japanese partner but not from a local firm. It means that the Japanese partner has the 
knowledge to access the local conditions or to utilize the ability to deal with local government and 
local work force. Therefore, Japanese-Japanese JV does not have the substantial disadvantage of 
being “foreign” in the local environment as WOS, thus:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The Japanese-Japanese JV entry mode will achieve, on average, higher performance than 
WOS entry mode. 
 
Japanese-Japanese JV is formed between affiliated or non-affiliated firms. Partner affiliation is 
defined in terms of whether the JV’s equity is between JV partners. According to Makino and 
Beamish (1998), firms are affiliated if: (i) they are parent firms (or subsidiaries) of the other home-
country partner; (ii) they are cross-holding of each others’ equity; (iii) the partners belong to the 
                                                 
5   The following examples describe this characteristics:  
(a) Showa do Brasil – established in 1982, is formed by: 
• Showa Corp. (equity of 51%) - first investment in Brazil; 
• Moto Honda da Amazônia (equity of 49%) - subsidiary of Honda Motor Co.,Ltd., established in Brazil in 
1971; 
(b) Equipamentoss NGK-Rinnai Ltda. – established in 1976, is formed by: 
•  Rinnai Corp.  (equity of 50%) - first investment in Brazil; 
• Cerâmica e Velas de Ignição NGK do Brasil Ltda. (equity of 50%) - subsidiary of NGK Spark Plug Co.,Ltd. 
established in Brazil in 1959. 
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same keiretsu group, which can be a group of firms linked to main banks through lending and 
financial relationships (Horizontal Keiretsu), a nonfinancial firm at its core (Vertical Keiretsu), or 
based on long-term supplier-buyer relationships (Distributional Keiretsu). According to this 
definition, Japanese-Japanese JV can be classified into: 
• Intrafirm JV – JV formed between affiliated home-country based (Japanese) firms; 
• Cross-national Domestic Joint Venture (DJV) – JV formed between unaffiliated home-
country firms. 
When partners are affiliated firms, it is assumed that the Japanese partners are better informed, 
share similar organization cultures, and exchange both tangible and intangible resources (Makino 
and Beamish, 1998). Thus, it is expected: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The Japanese-Japanese JV with partner affiliation (intrafirm JV) will achieve, on average, 
higher performance than Japanese-Japanese JV formed between unaffiliated firms (cross-national domestic JV) 
 
And consequently, this suggests: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The Japanese-Japanese JV with partner affiliation (intrafirm JV) will achieve, on average, 
higher performance than WOS and traditional IJV entry modes. 
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the strategies to gain local knowledge is through the utilization of 
a local partner. On the other hand, there is a high distance level of national cultures between 
partners, additionally to the cost related to selecting a local partner. Therefore, sharing the 
ownership between home-country based firms in which one of the partners can provide local 
knowledge accumulated in the host country could achieve the success in foreign entry. Local 
knowledge can be a source of advantage, when it is uniquely developed or accumulated through its 
learning-by-doing process of operating in the host country (Makino and Delios, 1996) or in a 
processing of assessing or transferring knowledge from other firms (Chang, 1995). Based on this 
explanation, Japanese-Japanese JV can be classified into: 
 
• Japanese-Japanese JV with partner experience – JV formed between Japanese partners 
which at least one of the partners has previous local knowledge accumulated in the host country; 
• Japanese-Japanese JV without partner experience – JV formed between Japanese 
partners that are accessing the local market for the first time. 
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Therefore, it can hypothesized that:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The Japanese-Japanese JV with a partner that has previous local experience accumulated in 
the local market will achieve, on average, higher performance than Japanese-Japanese JV formed between 
partners that are accessing the local market for the first time. 
 
And consequently, this suggests: 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The Japanese-Japanese JV with a partner that has previous local experience accumulated in 
the local market will achieve, on average, higher performance than WOS and Traditional JV entry modes. 
 
In addition to entry mode selection, according to Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1977, 
1980, 1988) some industry and firm-specific factors, as delineated in ownership and internalization 
advantages, have impact on subsidiary performance. By focusing on one host country (Brazil) and 
FDI outflow of a single country (Japan), the location advantage is controlled (Hennart, 1991; 
Woodcock et al., 1994, Nitsch et al., 1996). Although the ownership and internalization advantages 
have been long explored in the conceptual and empirical literature on FDI, multinational firms and 
foreign subsidiary performance, most other studies focused on entry mode and performance of 
subsidiaries established in developed and Asian developing countries. An empirical analysis in Brazil 
has not yet been explored. Furthermore, a unique feature was exhibited in Brazil when Japanese 
investment started in the 1950s. Japanese firms set up WOS or majority owned investment in such 
a distant country as Brazil and on a substantially large size by then-prevailing Japanese standards 
(Ozawa, Pluciennik and Rao, 1976). Additionally, although Brazil has achieved economic stability 
since 1994, and has been regarded as the most promising market in Latin America, with great 
economic potential due her size, natural resources and industrial base, Brazil is still considered as a 
high investment risk country. An investigation in this kind of environment outside the Asian 
developing countries to check the impact of ownership and internalization advantages on 
subsidiaries performance seems to be necessary.  
The ownership advantage explains a firm’s resource commitment and refers to assets power 
that a firm must possess to compete successfully with host country firms in their own markets, 
which can be tangible and intangible such as firm size, multinational experience, proprietary 
products or technologies, specialized know-how, and skills by its ability to innovate or to develop 
differentiated products (Dunning 1993, 1995; Nitsch et al, 1996). The size of parent’s firm reflects 
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its capability for absorption of the high costs of marketing, for enforcing patents and contracts, and 
for achieving economies of scale in foreign markets. Empirical evidence indicates that the impact of 
firm size on FDI is positive (Cho, 1985; Kimura, 1989). Another form of asset power, a firm’s level 
of multinational experience, has also been shown to influence entry choices (Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1991) and performance (Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 2000). As a firm expands its 
operations overseas, it learns more about how to cope with different environment in terms of 
economic, political and legal systems as well as the cultural distances. This ownership advantage 
generated corporate performance (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999), and 
consequently reflected on subsidiaries performance (Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 2000; Vega-
Céspedes and Hoshino, 2001). Finally, intangible assets are necessary to compete efficiently in a 
certain business line or a given industry (Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 2000). A firm will enjoy 
competitive advantages over its rival if it owns a proprietary product, specialized technology or 
knowledge, specific know-how and management capabilities (Kimura and Pugel, 1995). Based on 
this explanation, it is expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The impact of ownership advantage is positively associated with the subsidiary performance in 
Brazil. 
 
The internalization advantage explains a firm’s organizational control difficulties, and is 
primarily concerned with reducing transaction and coordination costs (Dunning 1993, 1995). It 
explains the cost advantages of internal hierarchies over arms-length market transactions for 
intermediate products. It may also include co-ordination benefits resulting from things such as 
transfer pricing to reduce tax liabilities, the flexibility to shift production quickly, the ability to 
respond instantly to competitive threats (Nitsch et al., 1996), and the managerial transfers 
(Woodcock et al., 1994). When firms make international investments, specific knowledge of the 
host country is gained, as it is more general knowledge of conducting international operations 
(Barkema et al., 1996). Firms with more experience in a host country have developed 
organizational capabilities to that country, which are able to make greater commitments to foreign 
investments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Further, Makino and Delios (1996) found that local 
firm’s host country knowledge and a parent firm’s host country knowledge are substitute channels 
for the acquisition of local knowledge when the parent or JV has spent a considerable amount of 
time in the host country. It is consistent with Chang (1995) who concluded that as Japanese firms 
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operate and learn in foreign environment, they build new capabilities and, thereby, overcome the 
disadvantages inherent in being foreign.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The impact of internalization advantage is positively associated with the subsidiary 
performance in Brazil. 
 
3. Empirical Design and Methodology 
Sample and data collection 
The empirical study examines the effects of ownership and internalization advantages, and 
entry mode, based on a new ownership classification of JV, on performance of Japanese 
subsidiaries MNEs in Brazil. The information sources used in this study were derived from Toyo 
Keizai Inc. - “Toyo Keizai Databank 2001: Japanese Overseas Investments (Kaigai Shinshutsu 
Kigyou Souran)”, listed by the host countries. This report, published annually since 1970, provides 
extensive information on the overseas activities of Japanese subsidiaries. Although it is published in 
Japanese, the Toyo Keizai Inc. survey is enjoying increasing acceptance among academic 
researches 6 . Additional parent company information was collected from the “Nikkei Annual 
Corporation Report 2001 (Nikkei Kaisha Nenkan: Jyoujyou Kaishaban)” and “Nikkei Annual 
Corporation Report 2001 – unlisted companies (Nikkei Soukan: Mijyoujyou Kaishaban)”, which 
shows information as at the end of fiscal years 1999-2000.  
The original sample contained 294 Japanese subsidiaries located in Brazil, but to be included in 
the sample, the subsidiary must have to fulfill the following basic characteristics: 
 
• subsidiaries with performance information - subjective measures of performance, which are loss, 
breakeven and gain. 
• subsidiaries in the manufacturing and service industry - Although the FDI theory was originally 
developed to explain foreign production, its application to service industries is considered equally 
appropriate (Boddewyn, Halbrich and Perry, 1986). Other studies also have employed both segments 
(Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2000; Vega-Céspedes and Hoshino, 2001; Brouthers, 2002). In addition, 
                                                 
6  Examples of studies that have employed Toyo Keizai database for empirical examination of Japanese FDI: Hennart (1991); 
Woodcock et al. (1994); Nitsch et al. (1996); Makino and Delios (1996); Beamish et al. (1997); Makino and Beamish 
(1998); Delios and Beamish (1999); Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino (2000); Vega-Céspedes and Hoshino (2001). 
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most of the service firms considered in this study is classified as hard service firms (32 cases out 44). 
Ekeledo and Sivakumar (1998), based on a classification scheme of service industry developed by Erramilli 
(1990)7, propose that studies involving hard service firms should show no significant difference between the 
entry behavior of manufacturing firms and that of hard service firms.  
• subsidiaries that had been in existence for more than two years at the time of the data 
collection 8 - Because of the tendency for new subsidiaries to take some time before their performance 
stabilizes, this study follows Woodcock et al. (1994). 
 
As a result of satisfying the characteristics mentioned, from the original data, the sample 
population of 102 cases was considered for analyses (Table 1): 
Table 1 - Sample distribution 
Entry Mode Manufacturing Service Total 
WOS 24 35 59 
Traditional IJV 16 2 18 
Japanese-Japanese JV 18 7 25 
Total 58 44 102 
    
Classification of Japanese-Japanese JV:    
# J-J JV (Partner Affiliation) 18 7 25 
   - J-J JV (Cross-national DJV) 8 5 13 
   - J-J JV (Intrafirm JV) 10 2 12 
# J-J JV (Partner experience) 18 7 25 
   - J-J JV (no partner experience) 10 2 12 
   - J-J JV (with partner experience) 8 5 13 
Source: Toyo Keizai Inc., Toyo Keizai Databank 2001: Japanese Overseas Investments  
Note: J-J JV is an abbreviation for Japanese-Japanese JV  
 
A standard t-test of nonresponse bias was conducted. Sample of subsidiaries that reported 
performance data (102 firms) were compared to the sample of subsidiaries that did not report 
performance data (192 firms), with the difference between two means being assumed to be similar. 
Although not reproduced in this paper, no significant differences was found between the two 
                                                 
7 Erramilli (1990) divided service for foreign markets into hard services (e.g. architectural design, education, life insurance 
and music) and soft service (e.g. food service, health care, laundry and lodging service). Hard service permits separation 
of production and consumption. Conversely, soft service requires simultaneity of production and consumption. It requires 
physical proximity between the service provider and consumer or the consumer’s possession being serviced.  
8 Toyo Keizai, Inc. database gives information of month and year of subsidiary establishment/operation. Based on this 
information, it was included only subsidiaries with more than two years of local experience in Brazil. 
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groups on variables such as subsidiary’s U.S. dollar values of equity and the total number of 
employees (Makino and Beamish, 1998). It is concluded that nonresponse bias is not a problem, 
and hence, subsidiaries with performance data and subsidiaries that did not report performance 
data came from the same population.  
 
Description and measurement of variables 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is subsidiary performance and the profitability is a common measure of 
a firm’s financial performance. However, unlike the ready availability of corporate performance data, 
particularly for public-listed firms, performance data at the subsidiary level is frequently lacking in 
consolidated reports and consequently it is very difficult to obtain. Therefore, the performance 
measure was derived from Toyo Keizai Database which represents the only information Japanese 
firms are willing to provide given their very private nature. The information was compiled by Toyo 
Keizai Inc. at the end of the fiscal year 2000, from public data and from a survey based on 
questionnaires sent to all firms listed on Japan stock exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya), as 
well as to major unlisted firms, and it is reported as the subsidiary general manager’s assessment 
(Beamish, Delios and Makino, 2001) in which there are three possible responses: loss, break-even 
and gain. The coverage of this report is close to the population of each firm’s foreign subsidiaries 
undertaken by Japanese firms listed on the Japan stock exchanges as well as by major unlisted 
Japanese firms (Hennart, 1991; Yamawaki, 1991). A number of recent studies have found that 
firms are reluctant to provide objective measures of performance of their foreign subsidiaries and 
have suggested that subjective measures be employed (Woodcock et al., 1994; Brouthers, 
Brouthers and Werner, 1999). These subjective measures of performance would provide valuable 
information on the progress of the subsidiary toward meeting parent firms’ goals and objectives.  
  Therefore, the dependent variable has ordinal properties (gain > breakeven > loss) and it is 
coded as “1” for loss, “2” for breakeven, and “3” for gain (Model 1 to 4). To ensure the result of 
analysis, another set of models was performed (Model 5 to 8), which the dependent variable is 
coded as “1” for low performance (breakeven and loss) and “2” for high performance (gain).  
 
Independent Variables 
This study adopts independent variables such as entry mode, ownership advantage, 
internalization advantage, and control variable for industry effect and for size of investment, which 
are expected to have an impact on performance of Japanese subsidiaries in Brazil.  
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Entry mode 
Using the 95% as cut-off point to differentiate between JV and a WOS, and applying the 
Makino and Beamish’s (1998) non-conventional ownership structure of JV, the entry mode is coded 
using categorical variables: “1” if WOS, “2” if Traditional IJV, and “3” if Japanese-Japanese JV.  
In order to investigate the Japanese partner affiliation, the categorical variable for Japanese-
Japanese JV is substituted by “3” if Cross-national DJV, and “4” if Intra-firm JV.  
And to examine the formation of JV with a Japanese partner that has previous experience 
accumulated in the host country, the categorical variable of Japanese-Japanese JV is replaced by 
“3” if the Japanese-Japanese JV are formed between Japanese partners that are accessing the local 
market for the first time (Japanese-Japanese JV without partner experience), and “4” if the 
Japanese-Japanese JV are formed with a Japanese partner that has previous experience in the local 
market (Japanese-Japanese JV with partner experience).  
In order to make the categorization of the Japanese partner that has previous experience in the 
local market, it was required two kind of information: (1) the major parent company years of 
experience in Brazil; (2) the partner years of experience in Brazil.  Therefore, it was classified as 
“Japanese-Japanese JV without partner experience in the local market” when there is no difference, 
in terms of years of experience in Brazil, between the major Japanese parent with the Japanese 
partner. The following example describes this classification:  
• Subsidiary: Nissin-Ajinomoto Alimentos Ltda – established in 1965, is formed by: 
- Nissin Food Products Co., Ltd. (equity of 50%) - first investment in Brazil; 
- Ajinomoto Co., Inc. (equity of 50%) – first investment in Brazil. 
 
On the other hand, it was classified as “Japanese-Japanese JV with partner experience in the 
local market” when there is a difference, in terms of years of experience in Brazil, between the 
major Japanese parent with its partners. The following example describes this classification: 
• Subsidiary: Pio XII Empreendimentos e Administração de Bens Ltda  – established in 1973, is 
formed by: 
- Kurabo Industries Ltd.  (equity of 25%) - first investment in Brazil; 
- Toyo Real State Co., Ltd. (equity of 25%) – first investment in Brazil. 
- Nichimen Corporation  (equity of 25%) – first subsidiary in Brazil was established in 1955; 
- Unitika Ltd.  (equity of 25%) – first subsidiary in Brazil was established in 1961. 
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Ownership Advantage 
Firm Size - the parent company’s equity (Cho, 1985) is used as a proxy for the asset power of a parent 
firm in logarithm form. Since the distribution of monetary values usually does not follow the normal 
distribution curve, the use of the natural logarithm of the quantity is applied, instead of the monetary value 
itself, to smooth the values and to bring them closer to the normal distribution.  
Multinational Experience – international management capabilities can be obtained from international 
experience with foreign markets in general, prior experience with a specific country, and experience from 
operating a particular foreign subsidiary. Therefore, the parent company’s total number of foreign subsidiaries 
(Cho, 1985; Delios and Beamish, 1999) is used as a proxy for multinational experience, which is measured by 
the number of overall subsidiaries that the parent firm established overseas minus one (focal subsidiary).  
Intangible assets – the major source of specialized knowledge and technology are a firm’s contribution in 
R&D. However, in this study R&D expenditure is not a good proxy to measure the intangible assets, because it 
focuses on subsidiaries in both manufacturing and service industries. Therefore, this study adopts the 
managerial know-how, which enhances efficiency, productivity and profitability in the operations. The 
efficiency of an organization is used as a proxy for managerial know-how (Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 2000; 
Vega-Céspedes and Hoshino, 2001). It is calculated as the parent company’s total sales divided by the parent 
company’s total number of employees. 
 
Internalization advantage 
The parent company’s experience in the host country introduced in logarithmic form is used as 
a proxy for internalization advantage (Lecraw, 1984; Makino and Delios, 1996; Delios and Beamish, 
1999). It is computed as the log of the total number of firm-years of experience in the host country. 
A firm-year represents one year of operating experience in the host country for one foreign 
investment (Delios and Beamish, 1999). Additionally, the subsidiary’s intensity of Japanese 
employment (Makino and Delios, 1996), which is the ratio of Japanese expatriate managers to total 
employees for each subsidiary, is included as a proxy of internalization advantage. Sending 
Japanese personnel to manage foreign activities has been used as a way to transfer knowledge 
from the parent company to the subsidiary.  
 
Control variables 
The impact of subsidiary’s performance comes from a wide range of factors. By incorporating 
appropriate control variables, it can be assured that the findings have been adjusted for other 
potential impacts (Pan and Chi, 1999). Performance level of firms in one industry may be different 
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from the other industries such as the required scale of investment, the nature of market and 
competition, and the stage in the international product life cycle in a particular country. For this 
reason, the industry effect needs to be controlled. To avoid biasness, as in Kogut and Singh (1988) 
and Brouthers (2002), it was included as a dummy variable to control industry effects which were 
given a value of “1” for manufacturing firms and value of “0” for service firms. Furthermore, as in 
Delios and Beamish (1999), it was included as a dummy variable to compare the main line of 
business of the Japanese parent with the subsidiary’s industry as described in Toyo Keizai Databank. 
Foreign firms that expand into a product market, not related to the parent’s main line of business, 
incur a greater need for new knowledge and assets as well as a greater risk of unsuccessful entry 
(Li, 1995). Related entries were coded as “1”, and “0” for unrelated entries. And finally, to control 
for size of investment, a dummy variable of subsidiary scale was considered in the analysis. Large-
scale subsidiaries (more than 100 employees) are coded as “1” and “0” for small-scale subsidiaries 
(less or equal to 100 employees).  
 
4. Empirical Analysis and Discussion 
The analysis in this study is based on the sample of 102 subsidiaries in Brazil. The parameters 
are estimated using the SPSS 10.0 statistical package.  
The level of subsidiary performance may be different from one industry to the other; 
consequently the industry effect has to be investigated. To statistically test for the relationship 
between industry and performance, three different classifications of industry are considered. The 
first classification refers to the general industrial sector (manufacturing and service firms), while the 
second classification comprises the main industrial sector with its categories, and the third 
considered the specific classification for service firms (hard and soft services). All industry 
classifications were cross-tabulated along with the three levels of performance (gain, breakeven, 
and loss), and a chi-square test of independence was applied. Although not reproduced in this 
paper, the results revealed no significance in any of the cases, which means that performance is 
not associated with a specific kind of industry.   
 
Testing for the relation between entry mode and performance 
In order to test if a statistically significant relationship exists between entry mode and 
performance, four tests were employed to ensure the results were duplicable, and were not the 
result of an inherent mathematical bias within one statistical technique (Woodcock et al., 1994; 
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Nitsch et al., 1996): Pearson chi-square – is often used with categorical variables, employing a frequency 
table to test the differences between predicted and observed occurrences (Nitsch et al., 1996); Kruskal 
Wallis rank sum test – is a non-parametric alternative to the one-way analysis variance test (ANOVA). It is 
based on the generalized rank-sum test that investigates the null hypothesis and tests whether the samples 
come from the same population, similar to an F-test, and if they have the same mean (Freund and Walpole, 
1987). Spearman’s rank correlation test – is a non-parametric test analogue to the typical Person 
correlation coefficient that returns values ranging from –1 to +1 (Nitsch et al., 1996). It is a measure of 
variance accounted for in the relationship and is computed from the ranks of the variables present (Freund 
and Walpole, 1987). Wilcoxon rank sum test – like most non-parametric tests, it is based on comparing the 
rank sums of two groups and it was used to compare pairs of modes against one another (Nitsch et al., 1996). 
With just two categories, it tests if the samples follow the same distribution, similar to a t-test, without making 
any reference to the means.  
Table 2 - Performance Breakdown by Entry Mode* 
  Performance   
Entry Mode Gain (3) Breakeven (2) Loss (1) Perform. Mean** No. of Cases
WOS 45.8% 27.1% 27.1% 2.19 59 
Traditional IJV 44.4% 22.2% 33.3% 2.11 18 
Japanese-Japanese JV 68.0% 32.0% 0.0% 2.68 25 
     Total 51.0% 27.5% 21.6% 2.29 102 
  Classification of Japanese-Japanese JV      
    # J-J JV*** (Partner Affiliation)      
        - J-J JV (Cross-National DJV) 61.5% 38.5% 0.0% 2.62 13 
        - J-J JV (Intra-firm JV) 75.0% 25.0% 0.0% 2.75 12 
    # J-J JV (Partner experience)      
        - J-J JV (no partner experience) 41.7% 58.3% 0.0% 2.42 12 
        - J-J JV (with partner experience) 92.3% 7.7% 0.0% 2.92 13 
Test A + Signif. Test B ++ Signif. Test C +++ Signif.
Pearson chi-square 0.047 Pearson chi-square 0.113 Pearson chi-square 0.005
Kruskal-Wallis 0.033 Kruskal-Wallis 0.070 Kruskal-Wallis 0.016
Spearman-Rank Correl. 0.019 Spearman-Rank Correl. 0.013 Spearman-Rank Correl. 0.006
  Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test   Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test   Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
WOS – Trad. IJV 0.766 WOS – Trad. IJV 0.766 WOS – Trad. IJV 0.766
WOS – J.J JV 0.014 WOS – J.J.JV (Cross) 0.110 WOS – J.J.JV (no exp) 0.493
Trad. IJVs – J.J.JV 0.032 WOS – J.J.JV (Intra) 0.033 WOS – J.J.JV (with exp) 0.003 
  Trad. IJV – J.J.JV (Cross) 0.124 Trad. IJV – J.J.JV (no exp) 0.412 
  Trad. IJV – J.J.JV (Intra) 0.047 Trad. IJV – J.J.JV (with exp) 0.005 
    J.J.JV (Cross) - J.J.JV (Intra) 0.480 J.J.JV (no exp) – J.J.JV (with exp) 0.008 
 Notes:  *  given as performance frequency per entry mode in percent 
             ** Mean is based on gain=3, breakeven=2, and loss=1 
             *** J-J JV is an abbreviation for Japanese-Japanese JV 
             + Test A - considering entry mode as WOS, Traditional IJV, and Japanese-Japanese JV 
             ++ Test B - considering entry mode as WOS, Traditional IJV, and Japanese-Japanese JV (Cross-national and Intrafirm JV) 
              +++ Test C - considering entry mode as WOS, Traditional IJV, and Japanese-Japanese JV (J.J.JV without partner experience and 
J.J.JV with partner experience) 
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According to the results illustrated in Table 2 - Test A, all tests were statistically significant 
considering the comparison of performance mean between WOS (2.19), Traditional IJV (2.11), and 
Japanese-Japanese JV (2.68). The Pearson chi-square (p=0.047), Kruskall Wallis test (p=0.033), 
and Spearman’s rank correlation test (p=0.019) showed significant difference better than p=0.05 
level. In relation to Wilcoxon rank sum test, statistically significant differences are confirmed 
between Japanese-Japanese JV and the other two modes. The strongest result was the 
WOS/Japanese-Japanese JV, which was significant at p=0.014 supporting the Hypothesis 2; 
followed by the Traditional IJV/Japanese-Japanese JV pairing at p=0.032 supporting the Hypothesis 
1. No significant difference appeared to exist between the WOS/Traditional IJV.  
 In Test B, the category Japanese-Japanese JV was classified in terms of partner affiliation in 
order to see if Intrafirm JV will perform better than other entry modes. Based on this classification, 
the performance mean of Intrafirm JV is 2.75, while Cross-National DJV is 2.62. The results showed 
that statistically significant difference was found between Kruskal-Wallis (p=0.07) and Spearman’s 
rank correlation tests (p=0.013). However, the Pearson chi-square test is insignificant. The 
Wilcoxon rank sum test showed significant differences better than p=0.05 between WOS/Intrafirm 
JV (p=0.033) and Traditional IJV/Intrafirm JV (p=0.047), which supports the Hypothesis 3b. 
However, no significant difference was found between Cross-national DJV/Intrafirm JV, thus the 
Hypothesis 3a is not supported.  
Based on the results exhibited in Test C, the formation of Japanese-Japanese JV with a partner 
that has previous experience in the local market (performance mean = 2.92) seems to be an 
effective entry mode strategy in order to obtain a good performance. All tests demonstrated 
significant differences better than p=0.01 based on Pearson chi-square (p=0.005) and Spearman’s 
rank correlation test (p=0.006), and better than p=0.05 using the Kruskal-Wallis test (p=0.016). 
Regarding the Wilcoxon rank sum test, it also confirmed significant difference better than p=0.01. 
Comparing the Japanese-Japanese JV with partner experience with the Japanese-Japanese JV 
without partner experience, it was significant at p=0.008, which supports the Hypothesis 4a. And 
based on comparison between the pairs WOS/Japanese-Japanese JV with partner experience 
(p=0.003), and the Traditional IJV/Japanese-Japanese JV with partner experience (p=0.005), it 
supports the Hypothesis 4b. 
Although not reproduced in this paper, it was performed the same previous tests to see if the 
service industry (44 cases) behaves differently from the manufacturing industry (58 cases) in terms 
of entry mode selection and performance. The results for Test A showed similar results for Kruskall-
Wallis test, Spearman’s rank correlation test and Wilcoxon rank sum test (comparison between 
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WOS/Traditional IJV and Traditional IJV/Japanese-Japanese JV). Only the comparison between the 
pairs WOS/Japanese-Japanese JV (p=0.03 for service firms and p=0.14 for manufacturing firms), 
and Pearson chi-square (p=0.20 for service firms and p=0.07 for manufacturing firms) reported 
different level of significance. Test B revealed similar results for Pearson chi square, Kruskall-Wallis 
test, Spearman’s rank correlation test and almost in all pairs of the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Only 
the comparison between Traditional IJV/Intrafirm JV, showed different level of significance (p=0.31 
for service firms and p=0.09 for manufacturing firms). Finally, Test C showed same outcome for 
Kruskall-Wallis test, Spearman’s rank correlation test and almost in all pairs of the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test. Some difference was found between pairs of Traditional IJV/Japanese-Japanese JV with 
partner experience revealed significant for manufacturing firms (p=0.03) and not significant for 
service firms (p=0.11), and Japanese-Japanese JV without partner experience/Japanese-Japanese 
JV with partner experience, p=0.04 for manufacturing firms and p=0.11 for service firms. The 
results of Pearson chi-square showed p=0.24 for service firms and p=0.02 for manufacturing firms. 
The mixed results can be explained partially by the difference of distribution between service and 
manufacturing firms’ entry mode categories. A standard t-test was conducted and it reported a 
significant result (p=0.001 for Test A, p=0.002 for Test B, and p=0.009 for Test C).  In addition, it 
was tried to compare manufacturing and service industry based on the classification of hard and 
soft service (Erramilli, 1990). However, because of the small number of cases for soft services, it 
creates so many empty cells (there is no case for Traditional IJV and for Japanese-Japanese JVs 
without partner experience) that there are not enough valid cases to perform the analysis. 
The direction of the relationship showed that Japanese-Japanese JV entry mode on average 
outperforms WOS and Traditional IJV entry modes in Brazil, especially when Japanese-Japanese JV 
is formed with a partner that has previous experience in the local market. The results are quite 
different from previous empirical tests that considered JV using a conventional ownership 
classification9. However, this study proposes that not only entry mode selection has impact on 
performance, but also some industry and firm-specific advantages (ownership and internalization 
advantages) have effect on subsidiary performance. The following analysis will consider these 
aspects. 
                                                 
9 The same test was performed comparing WOS with JV, based on a conventional ownership measure (majority-, co-owned, 
and minority-owned JV). The results showed a significant performance difference between WOS and majority-owned JVs 
applying Wilcoxon rank sum test (p=0.074), which means that WOS on average outperform JVs. On the other hand it was 
insignificant when applying Pearson chi-square and Spearman’s rank correlation test. When comparing WOS with IJV (JV 
formed by one foreign and one local partner), the results also showed that WOS performed better than JV, however no 
significant difference was found.  
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Ordered Logistic Regression 
As mentioned earlier, the performance measure for this analysis was the managers’ assessment 
of the subsidiary’s financial performance. Because the dependent variable has categorical values of 
ordinal properties (i.e., 1=loss < 2=breakeven < 3=gain), it was used as an ordered logistic 
analysis as the estimation procedure in Pan and Chi (1999) study. Ordered logistic models belong 
to the class of models identified as qualitative choice models and are appropriate procedures when 
the dependent variable has ordinal properties but is not a ratio scaled (Amemiya, 1981). In addition, 
Chu and Anderson (1992) showed that using ordered logistic regression improves interpretability of 
the estimated coefficients and enhances parsimony over the multinomial logit model in cases where 
it is reasonable to expect that the underlying categories are indeed ordinal. The basic form of a 
generalized linear model is: 
 
link ( ) [ ]kkjj xxx βββθγ +++−= ...2211        (1) 
 
where jγ is the cumulative probability for the jth category jθ is the threshold or constant for the jth category, 
kββ ...1 are the regression coefficients, kxx ...1 are the independent variables, and k is the number of predictors. 
The model is used to predict cumulative probabilities for the categories. A link function was chosen when 
determining the model, which was examined by the distribution of cases for the dependent variable. According 
to Table 2, the majority of the cases are concentrated in the higher categories (gain and break-even). For this 
reason, it was used as the complementary log-log link function, since that function focuses on the higher 
outcome categories. The signs of the coefficients in the ordered logistic regression can give important insights 
into the effects. A positive coefficient indicates a relationship between performance and determining variables, 
while the negative coefficient has inverse relationship.  
As a preliminary step to run the statistics, the correlation among the independent variables was 
verified for possible signs of multicollinearity. As can be seen in Table 3, there are some level of 
relationships, however, none of them appeared to be large enough to warrant concern of 
multicollinearity. In addition, variance inflation factor (V.I.F.) was examined to determine the 
existence of multicollinearity. None of the V.I.F. scores was above two, indicating that 
multicollinearity should not be a problem with these data. 
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Table 3 - Correlation Matrix of independent variables 
    Coefficients 
 Variable Unit of Measure Mean Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Ownership Advantage          
1 PAR_EQU Tho US$ 1,545,070 1        
2 INTERN Companies 37.93 0.219 1       
3 EFFIC Ratio 3,073 -0.021 0.462* 1      
 Internalization Advantage          
4 PAR_EXP Years 27.27 0.149 0.262 0.23 1     
5 SUB_R_JP Ratio 0.10 0.099 -0.026 0.05 -0.218 1    
 Control Variables          
6 INDUST Dummy 0.79 0.046 -0.162* -0.27 -0.027 -0.365* 1   
7 RELAT Dummy 0.57 -0.109 -0.326 -0.20 0.070 -0.078 -0.101 1  
8 SUB_SIZE Dummy 0.39 0.174 -0.001 0.46 0.248 -0.384* 0.456* -0.038 1 
Notes:  *indicates correlation significant at the 1% level 
              V.I.F. is less than two, showed no support for the existence of multicollinearity  
 
According to Table 4, the subsidiary performance is measured at three ordinal levels (gain, 
breakeven, and loss), and the ordered logistic regression was applied using four different models 
that, as noted in the chi-square, are significant at the one percent level. Model 1 is the base-line 
model, which examines the effect of ownership, internalization advantage, and the control variables 
on subsidiary performance. For the Model 1, several results are noteworthy. Regarding ownership 
advantage, the coefficients of firm size [PAR_EQU] and efficiency of an organization [EFFIC] are 
positively and significantly associated with performance. An interesting result was obtained by the 
variable international experience [INTERN], which is measured by the number of overall 
subsidiaries that the parent firm established overseas. The coefficient is significant, but contrary to 
expectation it is negative. An explanation for this negative relationship with performance refers to 
the costs of operating subsidiaries in various locations. It brings numerous problems of 
communication, co-ordination, control, and motivation (Kogut and Singh, 1988). In addition, the 
administrative obstacles in managing culturally dissimilar and distinct markets can be expected to 
exceed any potential returns that the multinational growth may bring (Gomes and Ramaswamy, 
1999). In relation to internalization advantage, the parent experience in the host country 
[PAR_EXP] is positively and significantly associated with performance. Interestingly, the coefficient 
of subsidiary intensity of Japanese employment [SUB_R_JP] was opposite of the predicted direction 
for the hypothesis. The sign is negative and significant. An argument to support this negative 
relationship was proposed by Tomlinson (1970), who explain that sharing the responsibility with 
local associates will lead to a greater contribution from them and to achieve higher subsidiary 
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performance. For the control variables, none of them are significant, which means that type of 
industry, relatedness, and size of investment are not consistent factors of the subsidiary 
performance. The insignificant outcome of industry effect also confirmed the previous result of chi-
square test for independence.   
 
Table 4 - Results of Ordered Logistic Regression  
Performance measure = Gain, Breakeven, Loss 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ownership Advantage      
Firm Size      
- Parent Firm Size PAR_EQU 0.2752*** 
(6.896) 
0.2946*** 
(7.461) 
0.2966*** 
(7.572) 
0.2866*** 
(7.136) 
Multinational Experience      
- International Experience INTERN -0.0114*** 
(10.551) 
-0.0112*** 
(9.078) 
-0.0113*** 
(9.236) 
-0.0101*** 
(7.769) 
Intangible Assets      
- Efficiency of an organization EFFIC 
 
 
0.0002** 
(4.401) 
0.0002** 
(4.136) 
0.0002** 
(4.483) 
0.0001* 
(3.276) 
Internalization Advantage      
- Parent Experience PAR_EXP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3925** 
(5.362) 
0.3817** 
(4.894) 
0.3552** 
(4.182) 
0.3830** 
(4.766) 
- Subsidiary intensity of Japanese 
employment 
SUB_R_JP
 
-1.8451** 
(4.060) 
-1.9215** 
(4.207) 
-1.9569** 
(4.359) 
-1.8584** 
(3.902) 
Control Variables      
- Industry INDUST 
 
 
 
-0.2121 
(0.351) 
-0.2249 
(0.356) 
-0.2334 
(0.386) 
-0.0904 
(0.057) 
- Relatedness RELAT 
 
 
 
-0.5986 
(1.777) 
-0.5745 
(1.544) 
-0.5350 
(1.332) 
-0.2842 
(0.353) 
- Size of Investment SUB_SIZE 
 
-0.3327 
(0.810) 
-0.4600 
(1.542) 
-0.4493 
(1.469) 
-0.0904 
(0.057) 
Entry Mode      
- Wholly-owned subsidiary WOS 
 
 
 
 -0.6273 
(2.121) 
-0.9661 
(2.281) 
-2.0706** 
(3.994) 
- Traditional IJV TRAD_IJV 
 
 
 
 -0.9576* 
(3.658) 
-1.2880* 
(3.511) 
-2.3773** 
(4.945) 
- Japanese-Japanese JV # JJ_JV 
 
 0   
  Japanese-Japanese JV (Partner Affiliation)     
- J-J JV  (Cross-national DJV)  
 
JJ_Cross 
 
 
 
  -0.5995 
(0.607) 
 
- J-J JV  (Intrafirm JV) # JJ_Intra 
 
 
 
  0  
  Japanese-Japanese JV (Partner Experience)     
-  J-J JV  (no partner exp) 
 
JJ_Noexp 
 
 
   -2.0350* 
(3.379) 
- J-J JV  (with partner exp)  JJ_Withexp 
 
   0 
Number of Cases  102 102 102 102 
Log Likelihood  187.265 183.058 182.409 178.047 
Chi-square  22.691*** 26.897*** 27.546*** 31.909*** 
Notes:  The dependent variable is coded loss=1; breakeven=2; and gain=3;  
Wald Statistics in parenthesis 
J-J JV is an abbreviation for Japanese-Japanese JV 
            # This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant (reference category); 
            *significant at the 10% level;  **significant at the 5% level;   ***significant at the 1% level; 
       V.I.F. in all equation is less than two, and multicollinearity did not threaten the estimations. 
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Model 2 has the base-line model and it includes the categorical variables of entry mode. The 
objective of this model is to test if the entry mode becomes statistically significant when it is 
combined with other variables in the analysis. If a categorical variable is used, the coefficients for 
each category represent the effect of each category compared to a reference category, which the 
coefficient is necessarily zero since it does not differ from itself. The purpose of this analysis is to 
compare the Jap-Jap JV with WOS and Traditional IJV, thus the selected reference category is 
Japanese-Japanese JV. In this case, the coefficient for WOS is interpreted as the contribution of 
selecting WOS instead of a Japanese-Japanese JV as the entry mode, in generating a gain instead 
of a loss or breakeven. In the same way, the coefficient for Traditional IJV is compared to the 
reference category. A positive sign indicates a positive contribution of selecting entry mode to 
performance while a negative sign indicates the opposite. The results in Model 2 showed 
equivalence to the outcome in Model 1 in terms of sign and significance levels, and confirmed that 
ownership and internalization advantages have impact on subsidiary performance. The influence of 
entry mode showed a negative sign of WOS and Traditional IJV, which means that Japanese-
Japanese JV perform better than WOS and Traditional IJV entry modes in Brazil10, however only the 
coefficient of Traditional IJV is statistically significant. It means that JV formed between home-
country based firms demonstrated better performance than JV formed between a local and foreign 
firms. This outcome confirmed partially the previous results found with the four tests for the 
relation between entry mode and performance (Table 2 – Test A). Hence, when combining other 
variables (ownership, internalization advantages, and control variables) in the model with entry 
mode, the Hypothesis 1 is supported, but the Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
Model 3 tests the base-line model with the Japanese-Japanese JV partner affiliation, in order to 
compare the performance of Japanese-Japanese JV formed between affiliated firms (Intrafirm JV) 
with other entry modes (Cross-national JV, Traditional IJV and WOS). Therefore, the Intrafirm JV is 
the reference category. It predicts that when partners are affiliated firms, the Japanese partners 
share similar organization cultures, goals and strategies, and consequently it is expected that 
Intrafirm JV would achieve higher performance than other entry modes. According to the results 
reported in Model 3, the variables of ownership and internalization advantages followed the same 
sign direction and level of significance obtained from the base-line model. The coefficients of entry 
                                                 
10 The ordered logistic regression (Model 2) was also performed applying the conventional ownership measure of JV. When 
comparing WOS with JVs (majority-, co-owned, and minority-owned JV), it showed that WOS performed better than JV, 
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mode WOS, Traditional IJV and Cross-national JV are signed in the hypothesized direction, and as 
the result obtained in Model 2, only the categorical variable Traditional JV is statistically significant. 
Thus, the findings partially support the Hypothesis 3b, while Hypothesis 3a is not supported.  
Model 4 examines the base-line model with the entry mode Japanese-Japanese JV that is 
classified according to the presence or absence of a partner that has previous experience in the 
local market. The reference category is the Japanese-Japanese JV with partner experience. It 
proposes that when home-country based firms form JV with a partner that has previous experience, 
and consequently has local knowledge in the host country market, it will achieve higher 
performance than other entry modes (WOS, Traditional IJV, and Japanese-Japanese JV without 
partner experience). Based on the results depicted in Table 4 - Model 4, the variable of ownership 
and internalization advantages are equivalent to that obtained in the base-line model, but with a 
decrease of significance level of the intangible assets variable [EFFIC]. As an intention of this model, 
the influence of entry mode revealed a significant association with subsidiary performance. All entry 
modes showed a negative and significant result, which means that Japanese-Japanese JV with 
partner experience outperform the Japanese-Japanese JV without partner experience entry mode, 
and also achieve higher performance than WOS and Traditional IJV. Including the variable of 
ownership and internalization advantages, and classifying the Japanese-Japanese JV according to 
the presence of a partner that has experience in the local market, the results support the 
Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b. And consequently, it is consistent with earlier statistic tests 
(Table 2 – Test C). 
To further examine the effect of ownership, internalization advantages, and entry mode on 
subsidiaries performance, the performance measure was classified into low performance 
(breakeven and loss) and high performance (gain). The dependent variable maintains the ordinal 
properties (high performance > lower performance), thus the statistics is run again using the 
ordered logistic regression model. The dependent variable is coded as “1” if low performance and 
“2” if high performance. By doing this, a new link function was chosen for this model, because the 
cases for the dependent variables become evenly distributed (according to Table 2, high 
performance <gain> represents 51%, and 49% is the low performance <sum of breakeven and 
loss>). Therefore, it was used as the logit link function.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
however the coefficients are insignificant. When comparing WOS with JV (formed by one foreign and one local partner), 
the same relationship was found and it was significant (p=0.08) showing that WOS outperform JV.  
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Table 5 - Results of Ordered Logistic Regression 
Performance measure = High (Gain) and Low (Breakeven and Loss) 
Variable  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Ownership Advantage      
Firm Size      
- Parent Firm Size PAR_EQU 0.2379** 
(4.321) 
0.4433** 
(4.675) 
0.4771** 
(4.705) 
0.4525** 
(4.618) 
Multinational Experience      
- International Experience INTERN -0.0105** 
(5.964) 
-0.0159** 
(4.821) 
-0.0164** 
(5.003) 
-0.0147** 
(4.065) 
Intangible Assets      
- Efficiency of an organization EFFIC 
 
 
0.0001* 
(3.164) 
0.0002* 
(3.498) 
0.0002** 
(3.904) 
0.0002* 
(2.779) 
Internalization Advantage      
- Parent Experience PAR_EXP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3928** 
(4.685) 
0.5814* 
(3.510) 
0.5412* 
(2.976) 
0.6062* 
(3.443) 
- Subsidiary intensity of Japanese 
employment 
 
SUB_R_JP
 
-1.9000* 
(3.741) 
-2.6564 
(2.510) 
-2.7241 
(2.601) 
-2.6832 
(2.332) 
Control Variables      
- Industry INDUST 
 
 
 
-0.1975 
(0.279) 
-0.2443 
(0.176) 
-026874 
(0.215) 
-0.0646 
(0.012) 
- Relatedness RELAT 
 
 
 
-0.7066 
(2.239) 
-0.9326 
(1.996) 
-0.8920 
(1.832) 
-0.5030 
(0.504) 
- Size of Investment SUB_SIZE 
 
-0.2555 
(0.451) 
-0.3538 
(0.424) 
-0.3175 
(0.335) 
-0.4259 
(0.584) 
Entry Mode      
- Wholly-owned subsidiary WOS 
 
 
 
 -0.6434 
(1.226) 
-1.0892 
(1.974) 
-2.3821** 
(4.351) 
- Traditional IJV TRAD_IJV 
 
 
 
 -1.0684* 
(2.109) 
-1.5121* 
(2.830) 
-2.8049** 
(5.158) 
- Japanese-Japanese JV # JJ_JV 
 
 0   
  Japanese-Japanese JV (Partner Affiliation)      
- J-J JV  (Cross-national DJV)  
 
JJ_Cross 
 
 
 
  -0.9138 
(0.803) 
 
- J-J JV  (Intrafirm JV) # 
 
JJ_Intra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0  
  Japanese-Japanese JV (Partner Experience)     
-  J-J JV  (no partner exp) 
 
JJ_Noexp 
 
 
 
   -2.7102** 
(4.526) 
- J-J JV  (with partner exp) # 
      
JJ_Withexp 
 
 
 
   0 
Number of Cases  102 102 102 102 
Log Likelihood  121.438 118.606 117.706 112.683 
Chi-square  19.925** 22.757** 23.657** 28.680*** 
Notes:  The dependent variable is coded Low Performance=1, High Performance=2 
 Wald Statistics in parenthesis 
J-J JV is an abbreviation for Japanese-Japanese JV 
             # This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant (reference category); 
            *significant at the 10% level;  **significant at the 5% level;   ***significant at the 1% level; 
V.I.F. in all equation is less than two, and multicollinearity did not threaten the estimations. 
 
According to Table 5, considering the performance measure as low performance and high 
performance, it confirmed the results from Table 4 (performance measure equals to gain, 
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breakeven, and loss), which according to the chi-square, the Model 5 to Model 7 are significant at 
five percent level, and the Model 8 is significant at one percent level. Interestingly, the variable 
subsidiary intensity of Japanese employment lost the significance level when combining with the 
categorical variable of entry mode, but it is still negative. All other variables are significant, 
although some of them decrease in significance levels. Therefore, in addition to ownership and 
internalization advantages, JV formed between home-country based firms (Japanese-Japanese JV) 
achieved better performance than JV formed between a local and foreign firm (Traditional IJV). 
When however Japanese-Japanese JV forms alliance with a Japanese partner that has previous 
local experience in the host market, it performed better than other entry modes (WOS, Traditional 
IJV, and Japanese-Japanese JV with no partner experience). 
 Finally, in all models of ordered logistic regression, the effect of ownership advantage in Brazil 
was both positively (proxy of parent firm size and parent intangible assets) and negatively (proxy of 
multinational experience) associated with subsidiary performance. Regarding the impact of 
internalization advantage, it is positively (proxy of parent firm local experience) and negatively 
(proxy of subsidiary intensity of Japanese employment) associated with performance of Japanese 
overseas investments in Brazil. Hence, these findings support partially the proposition stated in 
Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6.  
 
5. Conclusions and Limitations 
In contrast to earlier empirical research on Japanese FDI, this study addresses the relationship 
between performance of overseas operation and entry mode selection (WOS and JV), based on a 
non-conventional form of JV (Makino and Beamish, 1998). In addition, it examines the important 
role of MNEs ownership and internalization advantages on subsidiaries performance. The empirical 
results were obtained on 102 foreign investments using Toyo Keizai Databank 2001 in Brazil by 
Japanese firms that report information on performance. The results suggested that when 
considering a new classification of JV, JV formed between home-country based firms (Japanese-
Japanese JV) achieved, on the average, a higher performance than WOS and Traditional JV. This 
result is different from previous empirical tests, which showed that WOS outperform JV in the 
developed (Woodcock et al., 1994) and developing Asian countries (Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino, 
2000). Studies on performance of Japanese subsidiaries that did not account for the non-
conventional form of JV can lead to misleading results. When only JV (with a new classification of 
JV ownership) is taken into consideration, the result is consistent with previous empirical tests 
Department of Social Systems and Management, University of Tsukuba 
Discussion Paper Series No. 1120 
 - 27 -
(Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Hanvanich et al., 2003) which indicated that JV formed between home-
country based firms performed better than JV formed between a local and a foreign firm 
(Traditional IJV). Culture differences can influence all aspects of collaboration, such as the 
knowledge management process and management style, which affect knowledge acquisition and 
transfer capabilities of the partner that is not familiar with the local practices (Hanvanich et al., 
2003). Consequently, it also affects the JV subsidiary performance.  
The main finding of this paper suggests that the higher performance of JV formed between 
Japanese partners is not related to the affiliation relationship between partners (e.g. firms that are 
parent or subsidiaries of the partner, or firms that belong to the same keiretsu group). However, 
the success of Japanese-Japanese JV is associated with Japanese partner experience. In other 
words, the formation of JV with a Japanese partner that has previous experience accumulated in 
the local market. The absence of partner culture differences minimizes problems related with 
managerial complexity (Makino and Beamish, 1998), but the opportunity for gaining local 
knowledge through a Japanese partner that has accumulation of operational experience in the host 
country market leads to higher performance. This finding provides a managerial implication. Taking 
into consideration the previous explanation, it suggests that JV continues to be an attracting 
organizational form for companies to access the foreign markets. 
In addition, ownership and internalization advantages have both positive and negative impact 
on performance of Japanese subsidiaries in Brazil. In terms of ownership advantage, it is important 
to possess parent firm size and efficiency of organization in order to compete successfully in the 
host country. On the other hand, multinational experience showed a negative association with 
performance. Regarding the internalization advantage, the parent firm local experience confirms 
that accumulation of knowledge in the local market is a crucial factor to achieving higher 
performance. But the subsidiary’s intensity of Japanese employment indicated a negative 
contribution with performance.      
Considerations for the limitations of this study are discussed in conjunction with possible future 
research. First, the data used in this study were only one-year base. This was the most recent 
edition at the time that the data were collected. Future studies should include data of numerous 
years for statistical analysis. Second, the subsidiary data used in this study published by Toyo Keizai 
Inc., only reported the performance in a subjective measure. In fact, this problem cannot be 
avoided since this is the only source of subsidiary data available. Future studies should gather 
objective measure of performance as well as collect one’s own data based on questionnaires. Third, 
future studies should examine the impact on survival of Japanese subsidiaries and also to control 
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the firms’ prior entry into Brazil, in order to see the effect of sequential FDI on performance. Finally, 
it will be interesting to conclude whether this finding can be generalized JV with non-Japanese 
parents based in other countries and operating in other markets.  
Despite these limitations, this study has clearly provided the first empirical evidence of the 
impact of ownership, internalization advantages, and entry mode, based on a non-conventional 
ownership form of JV, affecting the operation of Japanese subsidiaries in Brazil.  
Department of Social Systems and Management, University of Tsukuba 
Discussion Paper Series No. 1120 
 - 29 -
References 
Agarwal, S., Ramaswami, S., 1992. Choice of foreign market entry mode: impact of ownership, location and 
internalization factors. Journal of International Business Studies 23, 1-27. 
Amemiya, T., 1981. Qualitative response models: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature 19, 1483-1536. 
Anand, J., Delios, A., 1996. Competing globally: How Japanese MNCs have matched goals and strategies in 
India and China. Columbia Journal of World Business 31, 50-62. 
Anderson, E., Gatignon, H., 1986. Modes of foreign entry: A transaction cost analysis and propositions. Journal 
of International Business Studies 17, 1-26. 
A.T. Kearney, 2002. FDI Confidence Index - Global Business Policy Council. September 2002, Vol. 5 A.T. 
Kearney, Inc., Chicago. 
Barkema, H., Bell, J., Pennings, J., 1996. Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and learning. Strategic Management 
Journal 17, 151-166. 
Beamish, P.W., Delios, A., 2001. Japanese investment in transitional economies: Characteristics and 
performance. In: Denilson D. (Ed.) Managing Organizational Change in Transition Economies. Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey 71-92. 
Beamish, P.W, Delios, A., Lecraw, D.J., 1997. Japanese multinationals in the global economy. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc, Massachusetts. 
Beamish, P.W., Delios, A., Makino, S., 2001. Japanese subsidiaries in the new global economy. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc, Cheltenham. 
Boddewyn, J.J., Halbrich, M., Perry, A.C., 1986. Service Multinational: Conceptualization, measurement and 
theory. Journal of International Business Studies 17, 41-57. 
Brouthers, K., 2002. Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode choice and 
performance. Journal of International Business Studies 33, 203-221. 
Brouthers, L., Brouthers, K., Werner, S., 1999. Is Dunning’s eclectic framework descriptive or normative? 
Journal of International Business Studies 30, 831-844. 
Brouthers, L., Brouthers, K., Werner, S., 2000. Perceived environmental uncertainty, entry mode choice and 
satisfaction with EC-MNC performance. British Journal of Management 11, 183-195. 
Chang, S.J., 1995. International expansion strategy of Japanese firms: Capability building through sequential 
entry. Academy of Management Journal 38, 383-407. 
Chen, H., Hu, M.Y., 2002. An analysis of determinants of entry mode and its impact on performance, 
International Business Review 11, 193-210. 
Cho, K.R., 1985. Multinational banks: Their identities and determinants. UMI Research Press, Ann Arbor. 
Department of Social Systems and Management, University of Tsukuba 
Discussion Paper Series No. 1120 
 - 30 -
Chu, W., Anderson, E.M., 1992. Capturing ordinal properties of categorical dependent variables: A review with 
application to modes of foreign entry. International Journal of Research in Marketing 9, 149-160. 
Delios, A., Beamish, P.W., 1999. Ownership strategy of Japanese firms: Transactional, institutional, and 
experience influences. Strategic Management Journal 20, 915-933. 
Dunning, J.H., 1977. Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: A search for an eclectic approach. In: 
Ohlin, B., Hesselborn, P., Wijkman, P. (Eds.) The International Allocation of Economic Activity. Proceedings 
of a Nobel Symposium held in Stockholm, Macmillan, London 395-418. 
Dunning, J.H., 1980. Toward an eclectic theory of international production: Some empirical tests. Journal of 
International Business Studies 11, 9-31. 
Dunning, J.H., 1988. The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement and some possible 
extensions. Journal of International Business Studies 19, 1-31. 
Dunning, J.H., 1993. Multinational enterprise and the global economy. Addison-Wesley Publishers, England. 
Dunning, J.H., 1995. Reappraising the eclectic paradigm in an age of alliance capitalism. Journal of 
International Business Studies 26, 461-491. 
Ekeledo, I., Sivakumar, K., 1998. Foreign market entry mode choice of service firms: A contingency 
perspective. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 26, 274-292. 
Erramilli, M.K., 1990. Entry mode choice in service industries. International Marketing Review 7, 50-62. 
Freund, J., Walpole, R., 1987. Mathematical statistics. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall Inc, New Jersey. 
Gomes, L., Ramaswamy, K., 1999. An empirical examination of the form of the relationship between 
multinationality and performance. Journal of International Business Studies 30, 173-188. 
Gomes-Casseres, B., 1989. Ownership structures of foreign subsidiaries: Theory and evidence. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 11, 1-25. 
Hanvanich, S., Miller, S., Richards, M., Cavusgil, S., 2003. An event study of the effects of partner and location 
cultural differences in joint ventures. International Business Review 12, 1-16. 
Hennart, J.F., 1991. The transaction cost theory of joint ventures: An empirical study of Japanese subsidiaries 
in the United States. Management Science 37, 483-497. 
Hennart, J.F., Zeng, M., 2002. Cross-cultural differences and joint venture longevity. Journal of International 
Business Studies 33, 699-716. 
Hofstede, G., 1997. Cultures and organizations: Software of the Mind.McGraw-Hill, New York. 
IMF, International Monetary Fund, 2001. ‘The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database 2001’, [www 
document] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2001/01/data/ (accessed 10 October 2002). 
JETRO, Japan External Trade Organization, 2001. White paper on Foreign Direct Investment 2001. JETRO, 
Tokyo. 
Department of Social Systems and Management, University of Tsukuba 
Discussion Paper Series No. 1120 
 - 31 -
Johanson, J., Vahlne, J.E., 1977. The internationalization process of the firm: a model of knowledge 
development and increasing foreign commitments. Journal of International Business Studies 8, 23-32. 
Kimura, Y., 1989. Firm specific strategic advantages and foreign direct investment behavior of firms: The case 
of Japanese semi-conductor firms. Journal of International Business Studies 20, 296-314. 
Kimura, Y., Pugel, T.A., 1995. Keiretsu and Japanese direct investment in US manufacturing. Japan and the 
World Economy 7, 481-503. 
Kogut, B., Singh, H., 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of International 
Business Studies 19, 411-432. 
Lecraw, D., 1984. Bargaining power, ownership, and profitability of transnational corporations in developing 
countries. Journal of International Business Studies 15, 27-44. 
Li, J., 1995. Foreign entry and survival: Effects of strategic choices on performance in international markets. 
Strategic Management Journal 16, 333-351. 
Li, J., Guisinger, S., 1991. Comparative business failures of foreign-controlled firms in the United States. 
Journal of International Business Studies 22, 209-224. 
Makino, S., Delios, S., 1996. Local knowledge transfer and performance: Implications for alliance formation in 
Asia. Journal of International Business Studies 27, 905-927. 
Makino, S., Beamish, P.W., 1998. Performance and survival of joint ventures with non-conventional ownership 
structures. Journal of International Business Studies 29, 797-818. 
Neupert, K., Montoya, R., 2000. Characteristics and performance of Japanese foreign direct investment in Latin 
America. International Journal of Public Administration 23, 1269-1283. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun,Inc., 2001. Nikkei Kaisha Nenkan: Jyoujyou Kaishaban (Annual Corporation Report). 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., Tokyo. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun,Inc., 2001. Nikkei Kaisha Soukan: Mijyoujyou Kaishaban (Annual Corporation Report–
unlisted companies). Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., Tokyo. 
Nitsch, D., Beamish, P.W., Makino, S., 1996. Entry mode and performance of Japanese FDI en Western Europe. 
Management International Review 36, 27-43. 
Ozawa, T., Pluciennik, M., Rao K.N., 1976. Japanese direct investment in Brazil. Columbia Journal of World 
Business 11, 107-116. 
Pan, Y., Chi, P., 1999. Financial performance and survival of multinational corporations in China. Strategic 
Management Journal 20, 359-374. 
Parkhe, A., 1991. Interfirm diversity, organizational learning and longevity in global strategic alliances. Journal 
of International Business Studies 22, 579-601. 
Department of Social Systems and Management, University of Tsukuba 
Discussion Paper Series No. 1120 
 - 32 -
Siripaisalpipat, P.,  Hoshino, Y., 2000. Firm-specific advantages, entry modes, and performance of Japanese 
FDI in Thailand. Japan and the World Economy 12, 33-48. 
Stopford, J., Wells, L., 1972. Managing the multinational enterprise. Basic Books, New York. 
Tomlinson, J.W.C., 1970. The joint venture process in international business: India and Pakistan. MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Toyo Keizai Inc., 2001. Toyo Keizai Databank 2001- Kaigai Shinshutsu Kygyou Souran (Japanese Overseas 
Investments): Listed by countries. Toyo Keizai Inc., Tokyo. 
Vega-Céspedes, C., Hoshino, Y., 2001. Effects of ownership and internalization advantages on performance: 
The case of Japanese subsidiaries in the United States and Latin America. Review of Pacific Basin Financial 
Markets and Policies 4, 69-94. 
Woodcock, C.P., Beamish, P.W., Makino, S., 1994. Ownership-Based Entry Mode Strategies and International 
Performance. Journal of International Business Studies 25, 253-273. 
Yamawaki, H., 1991. Exports and foreign distributional activities: Evidence on Japanese firms in the United 
States. Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 294-300 
 
